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NOTES
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF A SEARCH INCIDENT
TO AN ARREST: EFFICIENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS -
NEW YORK V. BELTON
Unreasonable searches and seizures are expressly prohibited by the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.' To enforce this constitutional
mandate of reasonableness, the fourth amendment requires that police, upon a
showing of probable cause,' obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate
before conducting a search.' Despite this proscription against warrantless
searches, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions4
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
For a complete discussion of the fourth amendment right to search, see Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). The fourth amendment
was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
2. Several Supreme Court opinions have articulated the notion of probable cause. See,
e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (probable cause exists when the facts and
circumstances known to the arresting officer would cause a prudent man to believe the suspect
had committed or was about to commit a crime); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963) (probable cause is evidence that would instill a belief in a reasonably cautious man
that a crime had been committed); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (prob-
able cause exists when there is less evidence than would justify a conviction, but more than
would raise mere suspicion). For a good discussion of the probable cause requirement, see W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3.1, 3.2 (1978 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE];
W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §§ 4.1-4.3 (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as RINGEL].
3. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579-80 (1971) (police must present sufficient
evidence to magistrate); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (police must obtain a search war-
rant through the judicial procedure whenever practicable); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
356-57 (1967) (searches conducted by police outside the judicial procedure are per se
unreasonable subject only to several exceptions); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951) (fourth amendment requires police to adhere to the judicial processes); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (police must present evidence to a neutral and detached
magistrate); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (a magistrate's decisions to search
is preferred over the quick, ad hoc judgment of a police officer).
4. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (plain view doctrine); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v.
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that obviate the warrant requirement. One such exception is a search per-
formed incident to a lawful custodial arrest.'
The underlying purposes of the search-incident exception' are the protec-
tion of law enforcement officers and the prevention of the destruction of
evidence.' Consequently, a limited, warrantless search is permitted pursuant
to a lawful custodial arrest to ensure the safety of police and the preserva-
tion of evidence. In an attempt to establish guidelines for police officers
conducting a warrantless search incident to an arrest, the Supreme Court in
Chimel v. California9 declared that a search incident to an arrest must be
limited to the area "within the immediate control" of the arrestee.' °
Although the standard adopted in Chimel appeared straightforward and
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile exception).
Although the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, it insists that
every exception must be narrowly construed. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (warrant requirement may be obviated only when the exigencies of the situation compel
that a warrantless search would be reasonable); Coolidge v. New Hamshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55 (1971) (warrant requirement is the general rule subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)
(exceptions to warrant requirement must be carefully and "jealously" drawn).
5. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (exigencies of the situation
must be proved by those seeking an exception to the warrant requirement); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (exigent circumstances may make a warrantless search
imperative).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search of arrestee's clothing
following incarceration valid); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search of
package located on arrestee pursuant to arrest sustained); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973) (search of cigarette box found on arrestee's person subsequent to arrest upheld).
The Court has concluded that in certain instances the search-incident exception will not sus-
tain a warrantless search. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of house
subsequent to arrest of individual inside the house); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(search of defendant's pants pockets when no valid arrest occurred); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of arrestee's automobile several hours after arrestee taken into
custody). See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 6.01-.06 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as WHITEBREAD].
7. The search-incident exception and the phrase "search incident to an arrest" will be
used interchangeably throughout this Note.
8. In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), the Court stated:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need
to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or ef-
fect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the
crime-things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the
accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent
where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
Id. at 367.
9. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
10. Id. at 763. Prior to Chimel, the Court had not set forth any specific geographic limita-
tions on a search performed incident to an arrest. The only requirement was that the search be
reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of defendant's
place of business following his arrest therein reasonable); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948) (search of farm building following defendant's arrest when police had time to ob-
[Vol. 31:581
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easily understandable, courts applying the Chimel standard to automobile
searches involving similar factual patterns produced inconsistent results.' In
an effort to rectify this inconsistency, the Court, in New York v. Belton,"
delineated a "bright line" rule establishing the permissible scope of a war-
rantless automobile search incident to an arrest.' 3 The Belton Court held
that incident to a lawful custodial arrest,"' the interior of the automobile
and any container therein may be searched without a warrant."
To understand the ramifications of the Belton decision it is necessary to
examine the development of the search incident to an arrest exception.
Although Belton appears to be a logical expansion of this exception, a
closer analysis of the decision reveals that the Court's holding significantly
undermines the fundamental principles of the search-incident exception.
Moreover, the Belton decision frustrates the reasonableness mandate of the
fourth amendment and permits an intolerable and unjustifiable intrusion of
an individual's privacy interest. As a result, Belton may cause more confu-
sion than it eliminates and may subject an automobile and containers
located within it to unrestricted warrantless searches.'" Finally, the ruling in
Belton effectively erodes recent limitations imposed by the Court on war-
tain a search warrant unreasonable); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of
entire apartment for five hours pursuant to arrest of defendant reasonable).
For a further discussion of the characteristics of the search-incident exception prior to
Chimel, see infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
11. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980) (search of package on
automobile seat valid search incident to arrest), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) and United
States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977) (search of brown paper bag on floorboard valid
under search-incident exception), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) and United States v. Frick,
490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973) (search of briefcase seized from automobile valid as search inci-
dent to defendant's arrest), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974) with United States v. Benson, 631
F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (search of leather totebag confiscated from automobile invalid as
search incident to arrest) and United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (search of
leather case containing a small pistol invalid as search incident to arrest).
12. __ U.S. __ , 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
13. Id. at 2863-64. The Court stated that in order for a person to know the limits of his
constitutional protection, and police to know the scope of their authority to conduct a war-
rantless search, a "straighforward" standard was required that could be "predictably" en-
forced. Id. at 2863. Justice Brennan stated that the majority's desire to create a standard ap-
proach for determining the validity of a search incident to an arrest resulted in "an arbitrary
'bright line' rule." Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. A custodial arrest is defined as a confinement or detention by police during which a
person is entitled to certain warnings regarding his constitutional rights. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). One author defines custodial arrest as an arrest in which
the police may take physical custody of the suspect. The decision to take custody is left to the
discretion of the police. However, in order to conduct a warrantless search under the search-
incident exception the police must have the intent to transport the person to the police station
following the search. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, §§ 5.1(h), 5.2(h).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. Included in the right to search a container located in an automobile
is the right to search a container located within another container. For example, a shaving kit
located within a suitcase. The Belton Court authorizes this search regardless of whether the
container searched was open or closed. Id.
16. See infra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
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rantless container searches performed under the auspices of the
"automobile exception." 7
HISTORY OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Originally, the authority to perform a search incident to a lawful arrest
permitted police to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee and the en-
tire premises where the arrest transpired.'" The need to locate and seize
evidence of the crime provoking the arrest justified this exception to the
general search warrant requirement.' 9 The only limitation placed on the per-
missible scope of such a warrantless search was the fourth amendment re-
17. Two recent cases severely restricted the power of police to search containers located
within the automobile when the validity of the search was predicated on the automobile excep-
tion. See Robbins v. California, __ U.S. , 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (closed container
in an automobile cannot be searched under the automobile exception unless container's con-
tents are in plain view or container outwardly displays what is located therein); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (closed piece of luggage located in automobile generally cannot
be searched absent a warrant). See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In
Chadwick, the government argued that the search of a locked footlocker located in an
automobile could be sustained under the automobile exception or the search-incident exception.
The Court rejected both arguments. In invalidating the argument that the search was justified
under the automobile exception, the Court stated that a person's expectation of privacy in a
closed piece of luggage required fourth amendment protection. The fact that the luggage was
placed in an automobile did not lessen that need for constitutional protection. Id. at 12-13. See
generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 7.2(e); RINGEL, supra note 2, § 10.3; Note, Warrantless
Container Searches Under the Automobile and Search Incident Exceptions, 9 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 185 (1980).
18. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court recognized the right to
search a person incident to arrest, but did so only in dictum. Id. at 392. Eleven years after this
initial recognition, the Court, in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), provided dictum
approving the search of a person and the location where the arrest was effected. Id. at 30.
Later, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the dictum of Agnello appeared to be
the foundation of the Court's decision. The Marron Court held that police, subsequent to a
lawful arrest, could search the premises where the arrest occurred "in order to find and seize
the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." Id. at 199.
The Court provides a thorough discussion of the historical development of the search-
incident exception in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-65 (1969).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947). The Court in both Harris and Rabinowitz upheld convictions based
on evidence obtained in a warrantless search of the entire premises where the arrest occurred.
The Rabinowitz Court stated that the search-incident exception gave police "the right to search
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime. . . " 339 U.S. at 61.
Application of the Harris and Rabinowitz decisions by lower courts conferred an unbridled
discretion upon the arresting officer in determining the area in which a warrantless search
could be conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Townsend v. United States, 271 F.2d
445 (4th Cir. 1959) (arrest on first floor, search of second floor sustained), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 921 (1960); Gentry v. United States, 268 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1959) (arrest in house, search
of garage upheld); Warren v. United States, 268 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1959) (arrest in apartment,
one hour search of apartment sustained); Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (arrest on first floor of residence, search of upstairs valid), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937
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quirement of reasonableness.2" In 1969, however, the Court restricted the
permissible scope of a warrantless search incident to an arrest in Chimel v.
California.2"
In Chimel, the suspected burglar of a coinshop was arrested in his home.
Subsequent to the arrest, the police conducted an extensive search of his en-
tire house.22 The Court ruled that the warrantless search in Chime! was
unreasonable and overturned the defendant's conviction."3 To ensure that a
warrantless search incident to an arrest complied with the reasonableness
standard of the fourth amendment, the Chimel Court set forth two re-
quirements that limited the previous liberal standards of the search-
incident exception. 2 ' First, the permissible scope of a search incident to a
(1958); United States v. Jackson, 149 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C.) (arrest on sidewalk, search of
residence upheld), rev'd on other grounds, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
This same liberal application of the search-incident exception occurred when the area searched
included an automobile. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.) (search of
defendant's locked automobile trunk sustained), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024 (1965); Crawford
v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1964) (search of arrestee's vehicle after he was removed
from scene by patrol wagon upheld), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 955 (1965); Fraker v. United
States, 294 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1961) (search of automobile after defendant arrested and vehicle
impounded upheld).
20. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Rabinowitz articulated the problem of relying solely on a reasonableness standard
stating that because of its circular definition, the trier of fact had no guidelines to determine
what was reasonable. To say that a search is unreasonable unless it is reasonable begs the ques-
tion of "what is a reasonable search?" Id. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The Rabinowitz Court rejected the standard adopted in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948), which required law enforcement officers to secure a warrant whenever practicable.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). See also Note, Scope Limitations for
Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969) (author argues that Rabinowitz rule has
failed to protect individuals adequately and should be redrawn).
21. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Chimel Court expressly overruled Harris and Rabinowitz. Id.
at 768. The Court declared that any attempt to justify a warrantless search conducted beyond
the area in which the arrestee could gain access could not rationally be founded on fourth
amendment principles. Id. at 766. Although Chimel unquestionably narrowed the area in which
a warrantless search incident to an arrest could ensue, it seems rather than overruling Harris
and Rabinowitz, the Chimel Court, in essence, simply refined the reasonableness standard pro-
nounced in these two earlier decisions. After Chimel, a search was reasonable if it was per-
formed in an area within the arrestee's immediate control, whereas under Harris and
Rabinowitz a search was reasonable anywhere on the premises where the arrest occurred. See
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 162 (1969).
22. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753-54 (1969). The police attempted to obtain the
defendant's consent to "look around," but their request was denied. Consequently, the police
informed Chimel that his lawful arrest gave them the authority to conduct a search of the
premises. The search performed encompassed every room of the defendant's three-bedroom
house, including the attic, garage, and workshop. Id.
23. Id. at 768. The Court determined that the search extended far beyond the defendant's
person and the area in which he might have acquired a weapon or destroyed an evidentiary
item. Thus, the Constitution compelled the acquisition of a search warrant. Id.
24. In addition to the two requirements, the Chimel Court also required that the search be
contemporaneous with the arrest. Id. at 764 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
19821
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lawful arrest could only encompass the arrestee's person and the area within
his immediate control.2" The Court defined the arrestee's area of immediate
control as the area in which an arrestee might gain control of a dangerous
weapon or destructible evidence.26 Second, the intensity of the search con-
ducted within the area of the arrestee's immediate control was to be
tempered by the arrestee's accessibility to a dangerous weapon or destructi-
ble evidence.27 Accordingly, the search of a concealed area within the ar-
restee's immediate control was deemed reasonable only if the arrestee could
gain access to the interior of the area in which a weapon or evidence might
be located.28 Whether a warrantless search complied with the two re-
quirements promulgated in Chimel required a case-by-case analysis.29
(1964)). The mandate of a contemporaneous search rests on the notion that "a search which is
remote in time or place from the arrest" is not justified by the need to protect police and
evidence. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
The contemporaneous requirement of Chimel was complied with in Belton. It was only a
matter of minutes after the arrest that the officer performed the search of the vehicle and the
defendant's jacket. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2862 (1981).
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated that a weapon or evidence located in a drawer near the arrestee presented as much
danger as a weapon or evidence located on the arrestee's person. As such, the majority felt
that there was "ample justification" for granting the police the right to search "the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control.' " Id. See generally Cook, Warrantless
Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. REV. 607 (1972); Note, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1194 (1970).
26. 395 U.S. at 763.
27. After recognizing the right to search the area within the arrestee's immediate control,
the Court pointed out that there was no justification for searching all drawers or concealed
areas which were located within that area of immediate control. Id. Thus, the appropriate
question is whether the contents of the container searched were accessible to the arrestee at the
time of the search. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 5.5, at 349-50.
28. The Chimel Court stated that the search must be "strictly 'tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762 (1969) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Therefore, because the search-incident
exception is initiated on the theory of police protection and preservation of evidence, unless the
arrestee can gain access to a weapon or destructible evidence that might be located in the con-
tainer, the search of the container is not a valid search incident to an arrest. As such, the war-
rant requirement should govern the search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763. See, e.g.,
United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978) (contents of box located in automobile
not accessible to arrestee once removed from vehicle, search illegal); United States v. Jackson,
576 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.) (contents of file cabinet and attache case near arrestee were not accessi-
ble, search invalid), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (contents of partially open suitcase located near arrestee were accessible,
search sustained); United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972) (contents of cigar
box situated on table close to arrestee were accessible, search upheld), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
884 (1972); United States v. Ajlouny, 476 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (contents of unlatched
briefcase within a few feet of arrestee's free hand were accessible, search valid), aff'd on other
grounds, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. Ill (1981).
29. 395 U.S. at 765. The Court reasoned that the facts and circumstances of each case
must be "viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles" in order to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the search. Id. See also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (there is no adequate formula for determining the reasonableness of a
search; each case must be decided on its own facts).
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Although the warrantless search performed in Chimel occurred in a
residence, it was clear, that the two requirements enunciated in Chimel were
also applicable to the search of an automobile following the arrest and
removal of its occupants. One of the key cases relied on by the Chimel
Court was Preston v. United States.3" In Preston, the Court applied the
search incident to an arrest analysis to the warrantless search of an
automobile. The Chimel Court made no suggestion that Preston could be
distinguished because an automobile, rather than a residence, was the site
of the arrest.3 In both cases the location of the arrest was irrelevant
because the focus of the search-incident exception is directed toward police
safety and the preservation of evidence.
Chimel was intended to provide the police and courts with a functional
standard for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search inci-
dent to an arrest. Nevertheless, lower courts inconsistently interpreted the
Chimel standard in factually similar situations." To simplify the Chimel
guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search, the
Court in United States v. Robinson," eliminated the intensity requirement
articulated in Chimel for searches of the arrestee's person.3" In Robinson, a
thorough search of the defendant at the time of his arrest disclosed a
30. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
31. In fact, the reasoning of Preston supported the outcome in Chimel. Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
Lower courts have maintained no reservations about utilizing the search-incident exception
to uphold the warrantless searches of automobiles. See United States v. Marshall, 499 F.2d 76
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1112 (1975); Strader v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 994 (1974); United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir.
1971); In re Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, Chimel v. Cali-
fornia: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 626 (1970) (author
concludes search incident to arrest should be applied to automobiles and residences in the same
manner); Note, Criminal Law: The Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search and
Seizure, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 447 (1970) (author concludes that the standards of Chimel are ap-
plicable to searches of automobiles).
32. Compare United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant handcuffed
and in custody of five federal agents, search of automobile valid), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831
(1974) and United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.) (defendant placed in squad car,
search of automobile valid), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045 (1972) and Patterson v. Lash, 452
F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1971) (defendant handcuffed and placed in squad car, search of trunk sus-
tained), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1075 (1972) with Pace v. Beto, 469 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1972)
(defendant separated from vehicle, search of auto interior invalid) and United States v. Rowan,
439 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (defendant arrested and removed from vehicle, search of
bag underneath driver's seat invalid) and United States v. Cohen, 358 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (defendants arrested and handcuffed outside of automobile, search of trunk illegal).
33. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
34. For a discussion on the impact of the Robinson decision, see LaFave, "Case-by-Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 127 (author concludes Robinson will open the way for widespread abuse and power of ar-
rest, and a wholesale invasion of an individual's privacy interests); Comment, Broadening the
Scope of a Search Incident to Custodial Arrest: The Burger Court's Retreat from Chimel, 24
EMORY L.J. 151 (1975) (author suggests that Robinson retreated from the restrictions set forth
in Chimel); Comment, Searches Incident to Arrest: The Expanding Exception to the Warrant
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crumpled cigarette package in his coat pocket. Upon closer examination of
the package's contents, heroin was discovered." The Court ruled the
evidence was admissible as the product of a valid search incident to an ar-
rest.3"
Rather than examining the specific facts to determine whether the arrestee
could have gained access to the contents of the package searched, the
Robinson Court introduced a "standardized procedure" for performing
searches of the person. 7 The standard adopted allows police, incident to a
lawful arrest, to search the contents of all objects located on the arrestee's
person. 8 The Court reasoned that an object located on the arrestee's person
always presents a potential danger to police and evidence, thus, eliminating
the requirement that there be some quantum level of "intensity" to conduct
the search. 9 According to the Robinson Court, any police search of a
lawfully arrested suspect is a reasonable fourth amendment intrusion." °
However, it remained unclear whether Robinson justified the elimination of
Chimel's intensity requirement when the police conducted a warrantless
search of a package or container within the arrestee's immediate control,
but not located on his person.'
Requirement, 63 GEO. L.J. 223 (1974) (author concludes that Robinson permits judicial sanc-
tion of broad law enforcement discretion safely shielded from any challenge from the arrestee).
35. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). In Robinson, the defendant was
arrested for driving with a revoked license. Following his arrest the police, in accordance with
proscribed procedures, made a complete search of the defendant's person. Id. at 220-22.
36. Id. at 235. The Robinson Court reasoned that the lawful arrest established the right to
search. Thus, pursuant to a lawful custodial arrest a thorough search of the person was a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment. Id.
37. Id. at 235. Essentially, the Court disagreed with the lower court's finding that the facts
of each case must be litigated in order to determine whether the reasons supporting the search
incident to arrest were present. Because police were forced to make quick ad hoc judgments on
where and how to search the arrestee, a single rule, applying in every situation, was preferred.
Id.
38. Id. at 236. In support of this standard the Court stated that because a lawful custodial
arrest was based on probable cause, any search of the person incident to that arrest required
no additional justification. Therefore, if the arrest was legal, any search of the person as a
result of the arrest was a reasonable fourth amendment intrusion. Id. at 235.
39. When a suspect is taken into custody and subsequently transported to the police sta-
tion, the extended exposure of the policeman to the arrestee places the officer in constant
danger. As such, the Robinson Court reasoned it would be best to adopt a standardized pro-
cedure whereby police could ensure that weapons and evidence were removed from the ar-
restee's person. Id. at 234-35.
40. Id. at 235. Accord United States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1978) (police
possess power to search a lawfully arrested person thoroughly); United States v. Johnson, 563
F.2d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1977) (police may conduct a prompt warrantless search of a person in-
cident to a custodial arrest), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978). See also United States v.
Robinson, 535 F.2d 881, 882-83 (police may not search person if arrest is not justified), rehear-
ing denied, 540 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. Although the Robinson Court did not explicitly limit its decision to searches of the per-
son, it went to great lengths to distinguish searches of the person from searches performed in
an area within an individual's control but not on his person. 414 U.S. at 224-26 (1973).
In United States v. Stevens, 509 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975), the
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The Court in United States v. Chadwick 2 indicated that the intensity re-
quirement of Chimel does apply to searches of containers not located on
the arrestee's person.43 The defendants in Chadwick were arrested while
standing beside an open automobile trunk. Police officers searched a
footlocker which they had removed from the trunk." In suppressing the
evidence obtained from the footlocker, the Court ruled that the search was
an invalid search incident to an arrest."5 The Chadwick majority reasoned
that once police obtained control of a particular container, there was no
longer any danger that the arrestee could gain access to a weapon or
evidence that might be contained within it."' Therefore, a warrantless search
court rejected the government's assertion that Robinson justified the search of a vehicle in
which a shot-gun was discovered. The Stevens court discerned that Robinson was limited to the
search of a person incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 687. Accord United States v. Edwards,
554 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (Robinson disregards the "technical" standards of Chimel only
for searches of the person), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978); Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19,
327 A.2d 516 (1974) (Robinson did not alter the Chimel standards for searches conducted
beyond the arrestee's person). Three states have restricted Robinson under state law stating
that a full search of the person can only be conducted for crimes of which the evidence can be
concealed on the person. See Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); People v. Brisen-
dine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975); People v. Clyne, 189 Colo.
412, 541 P.2d 71 (1975).
On the other hand, some courts have given Robinson a more liberal interpretation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.) (court relied on Robinson to support search
of briefcase), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744 (6th Cir.
1974) (court extended Robinson to permit container searches beyond the person); State v.
Venezia, 515 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1974) (court interpreted Robinson as permitting full search of
auto following driver's arrest).
42. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
43. Id. at 15. The Chadwick Court reasoned:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property
not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive con-
trol, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the
property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no
longer an incident of the arrest.
Id.
The dissent argued that to promote effective law enforcement a single rule was necessary
which would permit a warrantless search of property seized pursuant to a lawful arrest. Id. at
21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), See generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 5.5 at 351-55; Note, 27
DRAKE L. REV. 421 (1977).
44. 433 U.S. at 4.
45. Id. at 15. The search in Chadwick occurred more than one hour after the arrest.
Federal agents had removed the luggage to the Federal Building before the search ensued. As
such, the majority stated: "Warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the
time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in
time or place from the arrest,' . . . or no exigency exists." Id.
Justice Brennan stated that under the reasoning of Chimel it could not be asserted that con-
tents of the footlocker were accessible to the defendants. Thus, the search did not satisfy the
purposes of the search incident to an arrest exception. Id. at 17 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. The Court, however, noted that there would be exceptions to this general rule. For ex-
ample, when an arresting officer had reason to believe the container within their control con-
tained a "dangerous instrumentality," such as a bomb or explosives, a warrantless search of
the container could be executed. Id. at 15 n.9.
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is unreasonable when luggage or personal property is not located on the ar-
restee's person and is reduced to the exclusive control" of the police. Addi-
tionally, the Chadwick Court noted that an arrestee's privacy interest in
containers in the area within his immediate control merited protection
against a warrantless search incident to arrest.4"
The trilogy of Chimel, Robinson, and Chadwick strongly suggests that
warrantless searches of containers within an arrestee's immediate control,
yet not on his person, are not sanctioned by the search incident to an arrest
exception. Nonetheless, lower courts confronting this issue have reached in-
consistent results when applying the exception to searches of automobiles
and containers located therein." Recently, the Court in New York v.
Belton"0 attempted to eliminate the confusion in this area of warrantless
searches.
THE BELTON DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
While traveling on the New York Thruway, Roger Belton and three com-
panions were stopped by a state trooper for speeding. While routinely ques-
tioning the driver,' the trooper smelled burnt marijuana and noticed an
envelope on the floor of the car stamped "Supergold." The trooper ordered
the occupants out of the automobile and arrested them for unlawful posses-
sion of marijuana." The men were then separated into four areas along the
47. Exclusive control of a receptacle means such control by the police that no danger exists
that the arrestee could gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence located in the
receptacle. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977). The issue of exclusive control
is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct.
2860, 2869 n.5 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 16 n.10. The Chadwick majority noted: "Unlike searches of the person,
searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced
expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondents' privacy interest in the contents of
the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they were under arrest." Id.
By placing items in a container, such as luggage, whose purpose serves as a "repository of
personal effects," an individual manifests an expectation of privacy in those particular items.
Id. at 13. Consequently, an intrusion into a container in which an individual maintained a
privacy interest would be a greater infringement of an individual's rights than would occur if
the container was simply seized until a warrant could be obtained. Id. at 13-14 n.8. Accord
United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979) (once briefcase is reduced to ex-
clusive control of police, privacy interest of individual in briefcase prohibits a warrantless
search); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978) (once personal property is in
the exclusive control of police, justification for search evaporates and arrestee's privacy interest
prevails); United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (luggage which is no longer
within the immediate control of the arrestee is protected from warrantless search due to ar-
restee's privacy interest).
49. See supra note i1.
50. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
51. Id. at 2861. The officer asked to see the driver's license and automobile registration.
He discovered that no one in the car owned the vehicle or was related to the owner.
52. Id. at 2861-62. Prior to this particular incident, the trooper had seen several envelopes
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highway out of the reach of one another." Subsequently, the state trooper
returned to the automobile, seized the envelope, and discovered that it con-
tained marijuana."4 The trooper then approached the four men, advised
them of their Miranda rights," and searched each individual. 6 Following
this sequence of events, the state trooper re-entered the automobile and
searched the passenger compartment. On the back seat the trooper found
five jackets, one of which belonged to Belton. He unzipped the pockets of
Belton's jacket and discovered a bag of cocaine." This discovery led to
Belton's indictment for the criminal possession of a controlled substance. 8
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the admission
of the cocaine as evidence. Although the defendant plead guilty to a lesser
included offense, 9 he retained his right to contest the constitutionality of
the search on appeal.6" The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's ruling admitting the evidence as a product of
with the "Supergold" stamp and in each instance found the envelope to contain marijuana.
This past experience, along with the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the car, induced
the trooper to order the occupants out of the vehicle. Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, New York v.
Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
53. The officer testified that each defendant was removed from the automobile and patted-
down in order to ensure that none of the men possessed a weapon. Subsequently, the men were
separated so they would not be in physical touching distance of one another. Joint Appendix
at A-19, New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
54. 101 S. Ct. at 2862. In addition to discovering traces of marijuana in the envelope, the
arresting officer also discovered several partially smoked "roaches" in the ashtray of the
automobile. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 3. This finding provided the officer with
sufficient probable cause to place the four men under arrest. Joint Appendix, supra note 53, at
A-39.
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings include:
1. The right to remain silent,
2. [T]hat anything he says may be used against him in a court of law,
3. [T]hat before any interrogation is undertaken he is entitled to the presence and
aid of counsel,
4. [I]f he cannot afford an attorney, one will be furnished to him free of charge.
RINGEL, supra note 2, at § 44.
56. 101 S. Ct. at 2862. In order to protect the officer and preserve evidence, a thorough
search of the arrestee may always be made following the arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973).
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2862. In one pocket of the defendant's jacket the trooper discovered a
$20 bill containing a small amount of cocaine. An investigation of another pocket revealed a
plastic bag containing a larger quantity of the same substance. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
52, at 3.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2862. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.05 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
59. After defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied, he pled guilty to the at-
tempted criminal possession of a controlled substance. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 4.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05(8) (McKinney 1975).
60. 101 S. Ct. at 2862. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). In Lefkowitz, the
Court upheld New York's statute granting the right to appeal an adverse decision of a motion
to suppress evidence. The fact that defendant pled guilty following the denial of this motion
does not affect this right to appeal. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.70(2) (McKinney 1971).
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a lawful search.' The New York Court of Appeals, applying the principles
of Chimel and Chadwick, determined that once the jacket was reduced to
the exclusive control of the police officer, the arrestee could not have gained
access to the jacket pockets.62 Because the underlying purpose of the search-
incident exception did not require that the police officer make a warrantless
search of the jacket, the officer's action was unreasonable. Furthermore,
the expectation of privacy the defendant maintained in his zipped jacket
pockets" required that the jacket be seized and a search warrant obtained.
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's ruling admit-
ting the seized cocaine as evidence.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari6 ' to consider whether
the area within the immediate control of the arrestee includes the passenger
compartment of the automobile, notwithstanding that the arrestee has been
removed from the vehicle and placed under custodial arrest.65 A divided
Court" held that the articles within the interior of an automobile are "in-
evitably" within the area to which the arrestee can gain access incident to
his arrest. ' Therefore, the Court concluded that pursuant to a lawful
custodial arrest of an automobile's occupant, a warrantless search of the in-
terior of a vehicle and all containers therein was valid under the search inci-
dent to an arrest exception."
The Court's Rationale
The Belton Court endeavored to establish a workable definition of the
61. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). The court ruled that the
area searched was within the defendant's immediate control as stipulated by Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Additionally, the court determined that subsequent to an arrest, a
search of any personal property close "at hand" to the arrestee was an insignificant invasion
of privacy. 68 A.D.2d at 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
62. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420 (1980). In a 7-2
decision the court held that Belton retained a privacy interest in the jacket searched. The
lawful arrest did not preclude defendant's privacy expectation in the jacket pocket. Therefore,
the arrest could not be converted into a right to perform an unrestrained warrantless search.
Once the defendant had been removed from the automobile and arrested, a search of the
jacket, in the exclusive control of the police, was not a valid search incident to an arrest. Id. at
452, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577, 407 N.E.2d at 423.
63. The majority stated: "Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more private receptacle where
one might place one's most personal items than the zippered recesses of a jacket." Id.
64. 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
65. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
66. Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens filed concurring
opinions. Justice Brennan and Justice White filed separate dissenting opinions in which Justice
Marshall joined.
Although Justice Stevens concurred in the decision, he rejected the majority's analysis.
Rather, he reasoned that the case should be decided under the automobile exception. See Rob-
bins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
68. Id.
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area within an arrestee's immediate control when that area arguably included
an automobile.69 Initially, the Court reiterated the guidelines established in
Chimel.7 ° Although the immediate control principle of Chimel was expressed
in lucid terms, the Court recognized the difficulty that lower courts ex-
perienced when attempting to apply that principle to the interior of an
automobile."1 Consequently, the Court concluded that it was essential to
provide police with predictable guidelines for determining the permissible
scope of an automobile search incident to the lawful arrest of its occupants.
The Belton Court maintained that this could best be accomplished by
adopting a single standard rather than by a case-by-case approach."
The "bright line" standard established in Belton was based on two
premises. First, the Court reasoned that the trend in lower court cases sup-
ported the conclusion that the interior of an automobile is "inevitably"
within an arrestee's immediate control.7" Accordingly, police may conduct a
69. Specifically, the Court wanted to resolve the issue of whether the inside of the
automobile could be searched pursuant to the removal and the arrest of the vehicle's oc-
cupants. Id.
70. Id. at 2862-63. The Court reiterated its conviction that a lawful custodial arrest evinces
exigencies that make a warrantless search imperative. Id. at 2862. For a discussion of the
Chimel guidelines, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 2863.
72. Id. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (it is imperative that police
be provided with a "single familiar standard"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973) (because of the extended exposure to danger which results from taking a suspect into
custody, it is necessary to treat all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification).
The Belton Court stated:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort
of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be "literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."
101 S. Ct. at 2863 (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Pro-
cedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141).
Justice Powell, discussing the Belton holding, suggested that the exclusionary rule, which
suppresses evidence because it was obtained illegally, forces the Court to adopt single standards
so the police will not "blunder" in conducting a warrantless search. Otherwise, incriminating
evidence will be inadmissible and guilty individuals will be set free. Robbins v. California, 101
S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, the Court, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978), insisted that "the
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify
disregard of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. No cases are cited by the Court in justification of this conclusion.
Furthermore, there are cases which hold that the passenger compartment may not be within the
arreste'e's control pursuant to his arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards; 554 F.2d 1331
(5th Cir. 1977) (arrestee placed in squad car, search of automobile invalid); United States v.
McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant handcuffed near automobile, search of
auto illegal); State v. Skrobacki, 331 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (arrestee 15 feet
from auto and two officers present, search of vehicle invalid); Howell v. State, 271 Md. 378,
318 A.2d 189 (1974) (arrestee forced to lean up against car, search of automobile not sustained);
Wilson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (arrestee removed from automobile
and doors locked, subsequent search of vehicle prohibited). But see United States v. Isham,
501 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1974) (arrestee handcuffed with hands in front, search of automobile
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warrantless search of the entire passenger compartment incident to the
lawful arrest of its recent occupants.7 ' Predicated on this determination, the
Court concluded that containers situated in the automobile's interior are
also accessible to the arrestee and, therefore, are subject to a warrantless
search.'I
The majority rejected any consideration of an arrestee's expectation of
privacy in assessing the validity of the container search. 6 Neither the nature
of the container," nor the fact that it was open or closed altered police
authority to make the search. The Court declared that a lawful custodial ar-
rest permitted an intrusion into any privacy interest the arrestee might
have.8
Finally, applying the newly formulated standard to the Belton facts the
Court reasoned that because the jacket was within the interior of the
automobile at the time of Belton's arrest, it was within the area of the
defendant's immediate control and that the contents of the jacket were ac-
cessible to the arrdstee. 9 As such, the warrantless search of the jacket was a
valid search incident to an arrest.80
sustained); United States v. Woods, 468 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrestee placed in squad
car, search of vehicle valid); Pinkney v. United States, 360 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1976) (defendant in
custody of three officers, one with shotgun, search of automobile sustained).
74. 101 S. Ct. at 2804. The trunk of an automobile was not included in the Belton holding.
Id. at 2864 n.4. Although the Court apparently believes the trunk, passenger compartment
distinction is an easy one to apply, the ascertainment of what constitutes a trunk will in many
instances be difficult. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 2864. Although the Court stated that a reading of the cases prompted this con-
clusion, there are a substantial number of cases taking the opposite view. See, e.g., United
States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (search of container in auto pursuant to
suspect's arrest invalid); United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (search of lug-
gage seized from arrestee's automobile invalid). But see United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d
1309 (8th Cir. 1980) (search of package found on automobile floor sustained); United States v.
Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976) (search of paper bag discovered in arrestee's automobile
valid).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
77. Container was defined by the Belton Court as "any object capable of holding another
object." Expressly included in that definition was the glove compartment, boxes, bags, and
clothing. Furthermore, the container could be located anywhere within the interior of the
automobile with the exception of the trunk. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.4.
78. Id. at 2864. The Court noted that any search of a container seized from the automobile
need not be limited by the probability that the container searched contained a weapon or
evidence. Because the arrest was based on probable cause, any search subsequent to that arrest
needed no additional justification. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973)). If a container's contents are accessible to the arrestee incident to his arrest, it would
thwart the purpose of Chimel if the police were required to establish probable cause before a
search of the area could be effected. The lawful arrest creates the immediate need to search for
weapons and destructible evidence. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 7.1 at 504-05; WHITEBREAD,
supra note 6, § 6.01 at 134-35.
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2865.
80. Id. The Court rejected defendant's reliance on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), as support for his claim that he retained a privacy interest in his jacket following his
lawful arrest. The Court stated that in the Chadwick case the search did not fall under the
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CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION
The Belton decision appears to derive logically from the underlying prin-
ciples of the search incident to an arrest exception. First, based on Chimel's
immediate control standard, the Belton Court stated that the automobile in-
terior and containers therein were "inevitably" within the arrestee's im-
mediate control."' Second, employing the rationale invoked in Robinson,
the Court concluded that the contents of any. container within the
automobile are accessible to the arrestee and, thus, may be examined by
police. 2 Third, the Court disposed of defendant's privacy argument by
reasoning that a lawful arrest negates any privacy interest an arrestee might
possess. 3 A closer examination of the reasoning utilized in Belton,
however, reveals deficiencies in the Court's application of Chimel and its
progeny."
Traditionally, courts applied the Chimel immediate control test on a case-
by-case basis." In Belton, however, the Court retained the Chimel prin-
ciples but expressly rejected a case-by-case adjudication in favor of a single
inflexible standard." To reflect the spirit of Chimel, the Court's definition
search-incident exception, and therefore, Chadwick did not apply in Belton. 101 S. Ct. at 2865.
This conclusion is based on faulty logic. Simply because the search in Chadwick was found not
to fall under the search incident to an arrest exception does not mean that principles concern-
ing the search-incident exception espoused in that case are irrelevant. In Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969), the search was invalid because it did not fall under the search-incident ex-
ception, yet the principles enunciated in Chimel are the fundamental principles underlying the
search-incident exception. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. Consequently, the
Court's attempt to distinguish Chadwick appears questionable.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In his dissent in Belton, Justice Brennan proclaims that the majority disregards the
principles of Chimel. As a result, the majority "does a great disservice not only to stare
decisis, but to the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment as well." 101 S. Ct. at 2868-69
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens suggests that the Belton decision will "provide the constitutional predicate
for broader vehicle searches than any neutral magistrate could authorize by issuing a warrant."
Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1977) (arrestees shackled together
on bed, billfold on bureau not within their immediate control); United States v. Griffith, 537
F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976) (arrest in living room, brown sack in adjacent room not within ar-
restee's immediate control); United States v. Erwin, 507 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1975) (arrest in liv-
ing room, closet not within immediate control of arrestee); United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d
51 (6th Cir. 1973) (arrest three feet from desk, desk drawers within arrestee's immediate con-
trol). In United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973), the court specifically stated that
when a claim is made that a search is valid under the search-incident exception, the court must
examine the facts and determine whether the area searched was within the area to which the ar-
restee could gain immediate control. Id. at 728.
Courts also examine the facts to determine whether the automobile was within the arrestee's
immediate control incident to the arrest. See supra note 73.
86. The Belton majority noted: "Our holding today does no more than determine the
meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic content. It in no way alters
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of the area within an arrestee's immediate control should have been limited
to the area from which an arrestee could gain possession of a dangerous
weapon or destructible evidence under the specific circumstances of the ar-
rest.7
An examination of the facts in Belton demonstrates that the standard in-
stituted by the Court does not comport with the immediate control require-
ment established in Chimel. Belton and his companions were removed from
the vehicle and separated along the side of the highway. 8 The interior of
the automobile was not realistically within the defendant's immediate con-
trol. Moreover, the jacket, located in the back seat of the two-door
automobile, was not readily accessible to Belton. 9 Under these cir-
cumstances there was clearly no threat to the safety of police or the preser-
vation of evidence." By abdicating case-by-case adjudication in favor of a
"bright line" standard, the Belton Court expanded the scope of immediate
control articulated in ChimeP' to a point where it eviscerates the purposes
underlying the search incident to an arrest exception.
the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches
incident to lawful custodial arrests." 101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.3.
87. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court adopted the "grabbing"
distance as an adequate characterization of the area within the arrestee's immediate control.
Other courts have defined immediate control in rather unique manners. See, e.g., In re Kiser,
419 F.2d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1969) (within leaping range); State v. Bracco, 15 Or. App. 672,
676, 517 P.2d 335, 337 (1973) (within lunging distance).
88. See supra note 53.
89. To gain control of the interior of the vehicle the defendant would have been required
to overcome the policeman and re-enter the automobile. This sequence of events seems highly
improbable. Where the officer is positioned between the arrestee and the area searched, courts
have been inclined to rule the search invalid. See, e.g., United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (officer between arrestee and folder searched, search invalid); United States v.
Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973) (officer between arrestee and closet searched, search illegal).
See also United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1973) (no officers between arrestee and
chest, search sustained).
90. An examination of the trooper's testimony reveals that the search was not conducted
for the purpose of police protection or preservation of evidence. Not once did the policeman
pull out his revolver or feel he had reason to do so. Joint Appendix, supra note 53, at A-32.
Moreover, the officer had already seized the evidence required to substantiate a conviction of
the defendant for the unlawful possession of marijuana. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
91. The Court's conclusion that the interior of an automobile is inevitably within the ar-
restee's immediate control seems questionable considering the difficulty the New York courts
experienced in attempting to resolve this case. See generally Lewis, Mannle & Allen, The
Burger Court and Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: The Current Perspective, 7 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1 (1977) (the authors discuss the willingness of the Burger Court to prefer practical prob-
lems of law enforcement over fourth amendment standards).
Several factors can be used to determine whether the automobile searched was within defen-
dant's immediate control.
1. Whether the arrestee was placed in some type of restraint.
2. The location of the officer and the arrestee in relation to the car.
3. The ease of gaining entry into the vehicle.
4. The number of officers in relation to the number of arrestees.
2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 7.1 at 502-03.
After Belton, if a driver is removed from his vehicle, arrested, and subsequently handcuffed
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Even accepting the Court's conclusion that an automobile and all con-
tainers therein are inevitably within an arrestee's immediate control, the
Court's conclusion that the containers' contents are likewise accessible is an
unwarranted extension of the search-incident exception. Chime! required
that a search of objects determined to be within an arrestee's immediate
control be limited in its intensity."' As was true with the immediate control
requirement, the intensity issue was resolved by a factual analysis of each
case. 93 Hence, the contents of a container within the arrestee's immediate
control could only be examined when the facts indicated that the arrestee
had access to those contents at the time of the search.
94
An examination of the Belton facts indicates that the search of the jacket
did not comply with the intensity requirement enunciated in Chimel. The
defendant was separated from the automobile. Moreover, the cocaine was
located in a zipped jacket pocket resting on the back seat of the vehicle.9
Due to his separation from the car and jacket, it is beyond reason to
assume that the defendant had access to the contents of the jacket
pockets. 6 Thus, because the defendant lacked access to the pockets' con-
tents, the Belton search cannot be characterized as one prompted by the
need to protect police or preserve evidence.
The Court stated that Robinson provided justification for the search of
the jacket in Belton." Not only is this position unique to search-incident
principles, but it also disregards the reasoning underlying Robinson. Robin-
son permitted the unrestricted search of a container's contents when the
container searched was located on the arrestee's person.9 Because the con-
and placed in a squad car, a warrantless search of the arrestee's automobile will be permitted
because it is "inevitably" within the arrestee's immediate control. It would be hard to maintain
that a search under these circumstances was performed in order to protect police and preserve
evidence.
92. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
93. See United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979) (hand carried briefcase
capable of being quickly opened in order to gain access to contents, search sustained); United
States v. French, 545 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977) (contents of suitcase within arm's length of
defendant accessible, search valid); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1975)
(contents of file cabinet two feet from arrestee accessible, search valid); United States v.
Ajlouny, 476 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (contents of unlatched briefcase several feet from
defendant accessible, search sustained); State v. Brasel, 538 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1976) (contents
of briefcase which could be released by push of a button accessible, search valid).
94. The Chimel Court stated that "closed or concealed areas" within the arrestee's im-
mediate control were not automatically subject to a warrantless search. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
96. Justice Brennan argues that once the four men were removed from the vehicle, searched,
and separated, none of them had access to the jackets or their contents. Id. at 2867 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
97. The Belton Court relied on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), to conclude that containers located in the
automobile interior were subject to a warrantless search incident to an arrest. 101 S. Ct. at
2864. Both Robinson and Draper involved searches of contents located on the arrestee's person
and, consequently, do not substantiate the conclusion arrived at in Belton.
98. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. Lower courts applying Robinson have
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tents of a container located on the person are always accessible, the Robin-
son Court correctly reasoned that these contents always present a threat to
police and endanger the preservation of evidence." A case-by-case analysis
is not necessary when a search of the person is involved, and therefore, the
intensity requirement mandated in Chimel was eliminated.' 0
Although it was reasonable to eliminate the intensity requirement in
Robinson, no comparable justification exists for its elimination in Belton.
Because the jacket searched in Belton was not on the arrestee's person, it
was improbable that the defendant could have gained access to anything in
the jacket's pockets.'0 Consequently, the safety of the police officer and
the preservation of evidence were not jeopardized in Belton."'2 The elimina-
tion of the intensity requirement in Belton unjustifiably disregards the pur-
poses underlying the search-incident exception. As a result, Belton substan-
tially diminishes Chimel's protection. against unreasonable searches.
An additional flaw in the Belton decision precipitates from the Court's
refusal to acknowledge the privacy interest recognized in Chadwick.'0 3 In
Chadwick, the Court declared that an individual maintained a privacy in-
terest in a container not located on his person when personalty was concealed
within the container,'" and that a lawful arrest did not negate this privacy
also permitted searches of containers located on the arrestee. See, e.g., United States v.
Sheehan, 583 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1978) (upheld search of wallet pursuant to defendant's arrest);
United States v. King, 493 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1974) (upheld search of arrestee which revealed
narcotics); United States v. Moore, 463 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (sustained search of
camera case carried by defendant).
99. See supra note 39. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court stated
that the right to make a full search of the person recognized in Robinson was justified because
of "the potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests." Id. at 14-15.
100. The Robinson Court declared that neither the history of the search incident to arrest,
nor the practice in this country required a "case-by-case adjudication." United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
101. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. It seems unlikely Belton could have
entered the auto, grabbed the jacket, unzipped the pockets, and destroyed the cocaine before
the trooper would have had time to react. Lower courts are reluctant to sustain searches in
which the container's contents were not accessible at the time of the search. See, e.g., United
States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980) (search of suitbag in motel room where arrest
occurred invalid); United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978) (search of box in
auto after defendant removed from vehicle invalid); United States v. Rowan, 439 F. Supp.
1020 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (search of bag under automobile seat after arrestee removed invalid).
Cf. United States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978) (officer cannot move luggage to a
position accessible by defendant in order to perform a warrantless search).
102. See supra note 90.
103. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977). The Chadwick Court stated that
when an individual placed items inside a locked footlocker he "manifested an expectation"
that the items would remain free from public examination. Id. at 11.
Although the Court in Chadwick only recognized an individual's privacy interest with respect
to a locked footlocker, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), made it clear that any con-
tainer may merit fourth amendment protection. Id. at 764. One exception recognized in Arkan-
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interest."' To enhance the protection of this privacy interest, the Court
reasoned that once a container was within the exclusive control of a police
officer, a warrantless search could not be upheld under the search-incident
exception.'o
An application of the Chadwick analysis to the Belton facts suggests that
the privacy interest maintained by Belton prohibited the search of the
jacket. First, by placing contents into a zipped jacket pocket Belton overtly
displayed an expectation of privacy.' 7 Second, the defendant, as previously
discussed, did not have access to the jacket pocket's contents. When the
officer seized the jacket it was in his exclusive control, and there was no
danger that the arrestee could have seized a weapon or any evidence located
in the jacket."'8 The privacy interest of the arrestee should have prevailed
under these circumstances.
sas is if the container, by its very nature, could not justify a reasonable expectation of privacy
because its appearance indicated the character of the contents therein. For example, a gun case
or burglary kit would not retain an individual's privacy interest. Id. at 764-65 n.13.
Justice Harlan, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), suggested a two-part test to
determine what privacy interests warranted fourth amendment protection. First, a person must
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, society must recognize that expectation
as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
105. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977). Accord United States v. Caland-
rella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979) (custodial arrest does not diminish arrestee's expectation of
privacy in containers within his immediate control); United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314
(7th Cir. 1977) (custodial arrest does not obviate arrestee's privacy interest in containers within
his immediate control).
106. 433 U.S. at 15. In United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979), the court
relied on Chadwick to invalidate the search of a briefcase incident to its owner's arrest. The
court appropriately concluded:
Although the briefcase was apparently within the immediate area around the
defendant at the time he was arrested. . . . we believe that once the agents had
seized the item and reduced it to their exclusive control there was no further
danger that the defendant would secure therefrom either a weapon or an in-
strumentality of escape, or would destroy evidence contained in the briefcase. Thus
the interests sought to be protected by permitting warrantless searches incident to
an arrest were fully vindicated by the seizure of the briefcase at the time of the ar-
rest.
Id. at 249 (citations omitted). Accord United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978)
(once briefcase within exclusive control of police, justification to search incident to arrest
dissipates); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.) (individual enjoys expectation of
privacy interest in items within automobile, arrest alone is insufficient justification to search),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978). See also United States v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 554 (9th Cir.
1979) (search of purse would have been invalidated had court applied Chadwick retroactively);
United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.) (once police assumed control of package,
no justification to search incident to an arrest), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978).
107. See supra note 63.
108. See People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420 (1980). The
court noted that the dissenter's claim that the jackets were within the immediate control of the
arrestees and not in the exclusive control of the trooper was not supported by the record. Id.
at 452 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577 n.2, 407 N.E.2d at 423 n.2.
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The Belton Court relied on Robinson to support the rejection of the ar-
restee's privacy claims.' 9 Robinson, however, permitted the invasion of
privacy only when the containers were found on the person. Because the
contents of a container located on the person always present a danger to
police or can easily be destroyed or disposed of by the arrestee, it was
reasonable for the Robinson Court to conclude that the privacy interests of
the defendant were outweighed. In Belton, however, the location of the
jacket eliminated any possibility of it posing a danger to the officer or the
evidence. '" Thus, the defendant's privacy interests should have outweighed
the need to conduct a warrantless search of the jacket.''
IMPACT
The Belton Court adopted a single standard for determining the area
within an arrestee's immediate control when the area involves an
automobile. Although Belton will alleviate some indecision of police in per-
forming a warrantless automobile search following the arrest of its oc-
cupants,"' several aspects of the decision are problematic. First, the Belton
Court expressly excluded the trunk from its holding," 3 but provided no in-
dication of what areas are included in the definition of a trunk. Conse-
quently, Belton offers no guidance when the area searched involves a sta-
tion wagon, hatchback, motor home, or van."' In each of these situations,
the arresting officer must make the same quick, on-the-spot assessment of
109. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. In Robinson, Justice Powell stated that a lawful custodial arrest
permitted an intrusion of all privacy interests an individual might maintain in his person.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See also
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (search of arrestee's clothing pursuant to arrest
sustained); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (search of cigarette box located on ar-
restee following his arrest upheld).
110. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
Ill. Cf. United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977). The court in Berry concluded
that an arrestee's privacy expectation in containers within his immediate control, but not on his
person, was not diminished as a result of the arrest. Consequently, those containers not located
on the arrestee's person but within his immediate control could only be searched if a danger
existed that the arrestee could gain access to a weapon or evidence that might be located in the
container. Id. at 864.
112. After Belton, all that is required for police to conduct a warrantless search of the in-
terior of an automobile is a lawful custodial arrest of the occupants in the automobile. See 101
S. Ct. at 2864.
113. Id. at 2864 n.4.
114. Justice Brennan argued that the Court's "bright-line" rule may succeed in routine
cases, but in the end it will create more problems than it solves. Id. at 2869 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Even if the Court eventually sets forth specific guidelines delineating what a trunk includes,
other inequities exist.. For example, to protect a locked trunk from a warrantless search, but
permit the search of a locked suitcase in the passenger compartment seems unreasonable.
Presumably, the trunk cannot be searched because its contents present no danger to the
police, and the arrestee could not destroy evidence located within the trunk. Logic suggests the
same conclusion for a latched suitcase in the backseat of an automobile.
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what constitutes a trunk as was necessary after Chimel to determine what
area was in the defendant's immediate control." 5 In essence, the Court has
created the same inadequacies it purports to remedy.
In addition, Belton authorizes the elimination of the intensity requirement
any time a container searched is deemed to be within the arrestee's im-
mediate control." 6 Thus, Belton extends the Robinson rationale to situa-
tions not involving searches of the person. Belton rejected the intensity re-
quirement of Chimel not because an automobile was involved, but because
the Court reasoned that the container's contents are always accessible when
the container is within the arrestee's immediate control. The Belton majority
made no indication that containers in an automobile receive a lesser degree
of protection under the search-incident exception than containers in any
other location.' After Belton, containers located within the arrestee's im-
mediate control will be subject to a warrantless search regardless of the ar-
restee's accessibility to the container's contents.
Further, the Belton Court's utilization of the term "lawful custodial ar-
rest" may have a significant impact on fourth amendment concerns. A
lawful custodial arrest is defined as an arrest for which the police may
legally confine or detain the arrestee."' In some states, a police officer may
make a custodial arrest for any motor vehicle violation." 9 Consequently, if
115. This is precisely what the Belton Court set out to eliminate. See 101 S. Ct. at 2863.
116. Although some courts may eliminate the intensity standard only when the containers
located within the arrestee's immediate control are positioned in an automobile's interior, the
Belton opinion does not demand such a restricted reading. Id. at 2869-70 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Generally, the search-incident exception is applied in the same manner in all locations.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. The only exception prior to Belton was the
elimination of the intensity element in the search of an arrestee's person incident to his arrest.
See Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Thus, it appears reasonable to assume
that Belton may be utilized to permit the search of any container within the arrestee's im-
mediate control regardless of the circumstances surrounding the search.
117. Because the Belton Court does not distinguish containers located in automobiles from
containers located in other areas, courts in the future may arguably utilize Belton to uphold
unrestrained container searches in locations other than the automobile. See 101 S. Ct. at 2869
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In the past, however, when containers were within an arrestee's im-
mediate control, but not on his person, the goods were seized and a search warrant obtained.
See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980) (valet bag may be seized, but
warrantless search is invalid); United States v. Frazier, 545 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1976) (car could
have been seized first and searched after a warrant was obtained), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078
(1977); Cabbler v. Superintendent, Va. State Penitentiary, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975)
(seizure of personalty when arrested away from home upheld, but must obtain warrant to
search), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
This unrestrained right to search containers within the arrestee's immediate control clearly
contradicts Chimel. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 14.
119. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.482, 321.485 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2105 (Supp. 1978). In Texas, the police may make a custodial arrest for any traffic viola-
tion except speeding. See TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(d), §§ 147-153 (Vernon 1977 &
Supp. 1981); Tores v. State, 518 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Michigan permits of-
ficers to take traffic violators into custody only for certain violations. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
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an individual in one of these states is stopped for any traffic violation,
Belton proiides authority for police to perform a warrantless search of the
automobile's interior and all containers therein. ' The only protection an
individual may have from an arguably unreasonable search will derive from
state statutes which restrict the use of custodial arrests.'2 Obviously, this is
not the result intended by the search-incident exception.
The Belton Court's departure from the traditional search-incident analysis
also represents an effort to avoid recent limitations placed on searches per-
formed under the automobile exception. ' The automobile exception per-
§§ 257.727-28 (1970 & Supp. 1981). In addition, states such as Illinois permit a custodial arrest
for failure to produce a satisfactory bond following a traffic violation. See People v. Mathis,
55 Ill. App. 3d 680, 371 N.E.2d 245 (1977).
120. Justice White concluded that Belton permits searches of containers in an automobile
even though police may have no suspicion that the containers "contain anything in which the
police have a legitimate interest." 101 S. Ct. at 2870 (White, J., dissenting).
Presently, the Court has yet to place any restrictions on police authority to make a custodial
arrest pursuant to a traffic offense. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
In both People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 541 P.2d 71 (1975), and State v. Martin, 253
N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1977), the courts concluded that the issue of whether a custodial arrest for
a minor traffic violation is constitutionally permissible is undecided. Some courts, however,
have concluded that this issue has been answered affirmatively. See, e.g., Bur v. Gilbert, 415
F. Supp. 335, 342 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (while logic may dictate that a custodial arrest should not
be the practice for a minor violation, that is not the law); State v. Lohff, 87 S.D. 693, 214
N.W. 2d 80 (1974) (court summarily dismissed defendant's claim that a citation, rather than an
arrest, should have been issued). See generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 5.2; MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE].
In addition, even when a custodial arrest is made for a violation such as drunk driving, it
seems unnecessary to permit police to search every container within the interior of the
arrestee's automobile. Nonetheless, Belton provides the police with authority to search any lug-
gage, package, or container located in the drunk driver's automobile.
121. There have been a number of attempts to reform this area of the law. The common
suggestion is that the issuance of citations, rather than custodial arrests, should follow a minor
violation. See MODEL CODE, supra note 120, § 120.2; UNIF. R. CRIM. P. Rule 211 (1974).
For a discussion on the use of citations, see Berger, Police Field Citations in New Haven,
1972 Wis. L. REV. 382 (author concludes citation procedure provides an effective and work-
able alternative to the arrest process); Feeney, Citation in Lieu of Arrest: The New California
Law, 25 VAND. L. REV. 367 (1972) (citation procedure will result in a more efficient and sensi-
ble way to treat those charged with a crime).
122. Two recent cases, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and Robbins v. Cali-
fornia, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), restricted the ability of police to search containers in an
automobile under the automobile exception. See Comment, Search and Seizure-Carroll Doc-
trine-Automobile Exception, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 366 (1981) (Arkansas strengthens war-
rant requirement and fosters fourth amendment protection); Note, 11 SETON HALL 121 (1980)
(containers found in automobile cannot be searched without a warrant under the automobile
exception); Note, 55 WASH. L. REV. 871 (1980) (Arkansas severely limits the extent containers
located in the automobile may be searched under the automobile exception).
For a discussion of the development of the automobile exception, see Moylan, The
Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer
Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976). See generally I RINGEL, supra note 2, § 10.3;
WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, §§ 7.01-7.06.
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mits a warrantless search of an automobile when there is probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.'23 Recently, a limita-
tion was placed on warrantless searches performed under the auspices of the
automobile exception which required that a warrant be obtained to search
closed containers in an automobile.'2 ' This recognition of privacy interests
severely restricted the power of police. 2 '
Faced with this restriction on police power, it -appears that the Belton
123. Originally, justification for the automobile exception was based on exigent cir-
cumstances. That is, once an officer had probable cause to believe evidence was located in the
automobile, the threat that the automobile may have been moved and evidence lost permitted
police to make an immediate warrantless search of the vehicle. See Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925). However, as the automobile exception developed, the requirement
of mobility dissipated. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the defendants had been placed under arrest and removed to the
station. There was no possibility of the car being moved and evidence destroyed. Although no
threat of mobility existed, the Court upheld a search of the automobile and its contents in both
cases. Consequently, after Chambers, all that was necessary to examine the contents of an
automobile was probable cause. This result prompted strong criticism of the automobile excep-
tion. See, e.g., Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980) (arguing the search of an interior of an automobile should be
treated the same as the search of any other premises); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures
of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835 (1974) (arguing that an individual's privacy interests
must be protected); Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable
Items, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1134 (1973) (suggesting that clarification of the automobile exception
is needed); Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. The Exigency Require-
ment in Warrantless Automobile Searches, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 981 (1977) (criticizing the
abandonment of exigent circumstances and offering the use of privacy interests as a viable
alternative).
124. See supra note 122. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court suggested
that any container in which an individual maintained an expectation of privacy could not be
searched under the automobile exception absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 764-65. Justice
Blackmun criticized the majority in Arkansas, arguing that it would be impossible for police to
determine what containers warranted protection of an individual's privacy interest. Id. at 772
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consequently, in Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), a
plurality of the Court ruled that no container in an automobile could be searched without a
warrant under the automobile exception. Id. at 2846. Although Justice Powell concurred in the
judgment, he concluded that the blanket warrant requirement only should apply to containers
located in the trunk of the vehicle. Id. at 2848-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
After Robbins, it is clear no containers in the trunk may be searched without a warrant.
Because Robbins was only a plurality, it appears that items not exhibiting an individual's ex-
pectation of privacy (i.e., a dixie cup or cigar box), may still be searched without a warrant
when located in the passenger compartment of an automobile under the automobile exception.
Id. at 2850 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). However, Robbins does require a search warrant for
all containers in which an individual maintains a privacy interest if those containers are located
in the passenger compartment and the search is conducted under the auspices of the
automobile exception. Id. at 2846-47.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (marijuana discovered in
sealed cardboard box in arrestee's automobile inadmissible); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d
253 (10th Cir. 1979) (marijuana discovered in search of backpack located in automobile inad-
missible); Moore v. State, 268 Ark. 171, 594 S.W.2d 245 (1980) (search of shaving kit located
in automobile invalid); People v. Rinaldo, 80 I1. App. 3d 433, 399 N.E.2d 1027 (1980) (search
of box located in automobile invalid).
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Court, rather than condoning unjustifiable inconsistencies within the
automobile exception,"" reasoned that the search-incident exception could
be utilized to eliminate the privacy restrictions imposed on police power. '27
To render the search-incident exception effective for that purpose, the
Belton Court found it necessary to reject privacy concerns. 2 ' Consequently,
recognition of an individual's privacy interest in a container will be con-
tingent on the exception under which the validity of the search is argued.'29
Because of the importance of an individual's privacy interests, the par-
ticular warrant exception argued by a prosecuting attorney should not deter-
mine the recognition of these interests. If a person maintains an expectation
of privacy in a container, he or she does so regardless of the theory relied
on by the prosecution to justify a warrantless search. 3 ' After Belton,
however, pursuant to the arrest of a vehicle's occupant, the search-incident
exception authorizes a warrantless search of a closed piece of luggage
located in the passenger compartment of, the automobile.' 3' Yet, the
automobile exception would prohibit a search in the same scenario.' 32 In-
evitably, the expansion of the search-incident exception in Belton will
126. The Belton majority avoided the automobile exception in its analysis. 101 S. Ct. at
2865 n.6. Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion of the Court due to this avoidance. Id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
. Justice Powell recognized the confused state of the automobile exception. He stated that
"the Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on how
these cases should be decided." Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring).
127. It might have been predicted that the Court would reject the recognition of privacy in-
terests under the search-incident exception after its decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979). In Arkansas, the Court stated that in order for police to search luggage located in
an automobile without a warrant, some exception other than the automobile exception would
have to be utilized. Id. at 766.
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
129. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1981). The Robbins Court stated that
luggage taken from an automobile should receive the same protection as luggage seized in any
other location. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1979) (no greater need for
warrantless searches of luggage taken from autos than from luggage taken from other places).
130. When a search of an automobile is made pursuant to an arrest, the prosecuting at-
torney may argue that the automobile exception or the search-incident exception permitted the
search. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the attorney for the government
argued that both exceptions permitted the search. Id. at 11-15. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979), and Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), even though an arrest oc-
curred pursuant to the search of containers, the cases were argued under the automobile excep-
tion.
After Belton, the search-incident exception will probably be used exclusively by prosecuting
attorneys because of the Belton Court's refusal to recognize effectively an individual's privacy
interests under this exception. Belton provides the police with a greater power to search than
the automobile exception does when the search occurs pursuant to an arrest. The only time the
automobile exception remains valuable is when no lawful arrest is made and there is probable
cause that evidence of a crime is located within the automobile. However, even a search under
these circumstances has been severely limited. See supra notes 122 & 124.
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
132. See supra note 124.
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substantially reduce the use of the automobile exception and erode the pro-
tection of an arrestee's privacy interest.
CONCLUSION
The Belton Court held that automobiles and containers therein could be
searched incident to the arrest of the vehicle's occupants. It did so in an ef-
fort to provide police with a single workable standard that would max-
imize police efficiency. Unfortunately, the standard adopted by the Court
fosters more confusion than it eliminates and ultimately subjects an
automobile's interior and all containers therein to unreasonable searches.
In addition, the Court's refusal to acknowledge privacy interests
disregards recent Court cases that unequivocally recognized these interests
in containers not located on the person. Apparently, the Belton Court chose
to provide police with greater power under the search-incident exception to
avoid limitations caused by the recognition of an individual's privacy in-
terest in container searches performed under the automobile exception.
Belton's expansion of the search-incident exception, however, undermines
the two requirements articulated in Chimel. These two requirements had
been established to protect an individual from unreasonable searches. If
Chimel is to remain a valuable tool in the determination of permissive
guidelines for a warrantless search, the Court should not interpret it as
justification for instituting inflexible standards. To do so raises doubt as to
the constitutionality of searches conducted under the search-incident excep-
tion.
Thomas R. Canham
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